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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A.   RUSSIAN DECISIONS AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM 
US-Russian relations took an unforeseen, positive turn following the 11 
September terrorist attacks on the United States.  Unexpectedly, Russia pledged and 
delivered support to the United States in very concrete and real ways.  US-Russian 
collaboration in Afghanistan surpassed most previous efforts in terms of the level of 
cooperation attained, especially in traditionally inviolable areas such as intelligence-
sharing; however, disagreements about the invasion of Iraq confirmed that there is still a 
long way to go before the US and Russia have a genuine, enduring partnership.  This 
study of Russia’s decisions during the war on terrorism will expose the rationale behind 
those decisions and illuminate issues and concerns that factor into Russian foreign policy.  
Although there are currently many different views on what drives Russian foreign 
policy, a few key issues stand out.  Analysts offer three dominant rationales regarding 
Russia’s behavior:  1) the desire to balance US unilateralism, 2) to gain support for “anti-
terrorist” action in Chechnya, and 3) to advance the nation’s economic interests.  These 
motives are reflected in the Foreign Policy Concept signed by President Putin in July 
2000.  It states that the “uppermost priority of the foreign policy course of Russia is to 
protect the interests of the individual and society” by ensuring the “security of the 
country,” preserving and strengthening “sovereignty and territorial integrity,” and 
achieving “firm and prestigious positions in the world community.”  Further emphasis is 
placed on improving the economy, enhancing the standard of living, and eliminating 
existing and emerging “hotbeds of tension and conflicts in regions adjacent to the 
Russian Federation.”1  
Beyond the broader context of general Russian foreign policy, Chechnya, the 
economy, and the balance of global power are particularly relevant when considering 
Russia’s decisions to support the US in Afghanistan and not in Iraq.  However, other 
rationales for Russia’s decisions in the war on terrorism do exist.  Some authors suggest 
                                                 
1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and Press Department, Foreign 
Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, Moscow, (28 June 2000) [on-line]; available from 
http://www.ln.mid.ru; Internet; accessed on 15 April 2004. 
2 
that support was based on the idea of quid pro quo.  In other words, the US would 
reconsider its positions on the ABM treaty withdrawal, NATO expansion, and 
rescheduling and forgiving portions of the Soviet-era debt in return for Russia’s 
cooperation in the anti-terrorist coalition.2  Another explanation is that Putin “is 
following a predictable, pragmatic foreign policy, based on relatively clearly defined 
national interests.”3  A more cynical view is that the decisions were based on a leader’s 
whim.4  Although these views should not be entirely discounted, more detail is needed.  
If assistance is based on quid pro quo, what exactly is Russia looking to gain in return for 
its cooperation?  If Putin is following a pragmatic foreign policy, how does he prioritize 
Russia’s national interests?  Focusing on the motivations and interests that drive Russian 
behavior will provide better insight into Russian foreign policy and a greater ability to 
predict future actions.  For that reason, this thesis evaluates whether Russia is motivated 
by advancing national economic interests, gaining approval of action in Chechnya, or 
balancing US power.  It concludes that the primary motive in Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and in Russian foreign policy in 
general, is the desire to further national economic objectives.  
 
B.   BACKGROUND 
US-Russian relations during the past one and a half decades can be characterized 
as a rollercoaster ride—reaching great heights in one moment, only to come crashing 
down in the next.  From the initial euphoric optimism following the collapse of 
communism to the occupation of the Pristina airport by Russian troops during the Kosovo 
conflict, it has been difficult to predict which direction Russian foreign policy might turn 
next.  One major shift in US-Russian relations followed the terrorist attacks on 9/11.  In a 
televised address shortly after September 11, 2001, President Putin expressed his 
empathy for America, stating, “Russia knows directly what terrorism means.”  Later, in a 
joint statement, Presidents Bush and Putin “resolved to advance cooperation in combating 
                                                 
2 Leon Aron, “Russia’s Choice,” Russian Outlook, Winter 2002 [on-line]; available from 
http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/aei/aro/ar116; Internet; accessed on 3 February 2004. 
3 Jeronim Perovic, “Coming Closer or Drifting Apart?  EU-Russia Partnership and EU Enlargement in 
Eastern Europe,” May 2003 [on-line]; available from http://www.ciaonet.org/casestudy/pej01/index.html; 
Internet; accessed on 3 February 2004. 
4 Aron, “Russia’s Choice.” 
3 
new terrorist threats” and announced the formation of a US-Russia Working Group to do 
so.5  These statements proclaiming cooperation and partnership between the US and 
Russia were indicative of a radical shift in Russian foreign policy, which had traditionally 
viewed the US as an actor with whom Russia had “serious” and “fundamental 
differences.”6  Relations continued to strengthen until the US began discussing the 
invasion of Iraq with or without United Nations (UN) Security Council backing.  Once 
again US-Russian relations became strained and arduous.  It is important to examine US-
Russian relations over the past decade for a few reasons.  It helps put the current 
relationship in context, depicts any trends that may be relevant to the discussion of 
Russian foreign policy, and exposes the significance of the Russian support provided to 
the US during the war on terrorism.  The next section provides background information 
about US-Russian relations since the end of the Cold War and political affairs that may 
influence foreign policy. 
1.   US-Russian Relations 
For decades, political scientists studied US-Russian relations in terms of a bipolar 
world with two superpowers balancing each others’ actions.  After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union the geopolitical environment was transformed.  For the US, the nineties 
were a time of cautious optimism as Russian began its economic and democratic reforms; 
meanwhile, Russia struggled to define its new role in international affairs.7  Relations 
cooled considerably toward the end of the nineties and remained low on the US priority 
list when the Bush administration took office.8  However, another surprising 
transformation began when President Putin declared his support for the US-led war on 
terrorism in the wake of the September 11th attacks.  US-Russian relations changed 
dramatically with significant implications for both US and Russian foreign policy. 
                                                 
5 U.S. and Russian Presidents, Joint Statement, “Joint Statement on Counterterrorism by the President 
of the United States and the President of Russia,” 21 October 2001 [on-line]; available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011022-11.html; Internet; accessed on 4 March 2004. 
6 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (28 June 2000). 
7 Peter Rutland, “Shifting Sands: Russia’s Economic Development and its Relations with the West,” in 
Russia and the West at the Millennium, eds. Medvedev, Konovalov, and Oznobishchev (George C. 
Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2003), 109. 
8 Alexander A. Belkin, “Russian-US Relations and the Global Counter-Terrorist Campaign,” paper for 
the conference on “Russian Security and the Continuing War on Terrorism,” (Monterey, CA, 16-17 
September 2003):  2. 
4 
After the collapse of the USSR, American policy focused on reconstructing 
Russia.  This made Russia’s development and transition to a capitalist market-based 
economy the central theme of US-Russian relations.  There was more common ground 
for the two countries in economics than on security issues, such as Chechnya and NATO 
enlargement.  This policy also fit well with President Clinton’s aim of spreading market 
democracy, which he felt was good for American business and in limiting war.9  Russia 
desired American assistance, but at the same time wanted to maintain its great power role 
in the world based on its nuclear capabilities; Russia was not ready to accept the US as 
the world hegemon.10 
Relations between the two nations waxed and waned as the nineties progressed.  
Both countries had underestimated the difficulties of creating a market democracy in 
Russia and were frustrated by overly idealistic hopes of success.  Disagreements about 
Kosovo, Chechnya, Iran, NATO enlargement, and a rapidly declining Russian economy 
added additional strain to the relationship.  “Hundreds of millions of dollars of US aid, 
and billions of dollars of IMF and World Bank loans, disappeared into Russia with few 
positive results to show for them.”11  The financial crisis in August 1998 further 
aggravated relations.  The US-Russian relationship cooled even more as the nineties 
came to a close.   
Russians were disillusioned with the Clinton administration’s failed attempts at 
reform and the growing imbalance in power during Clinton’s terms.  As a result, when 
President Putin was elected in the spring of 2000, he chose not to focus on improving 
relations until the upcoming US presidential election.  The Russian political elite were 
hopeful when they heard a Republican president had been elected; during the past few 
decades, relations were perceived to have been, in general, better under Republicans than 
Democrats.  However, Russia was initially placed low on the new Bush administration’s 
                                                 
9 Rutland, “Shifting Sands: Russia’s Economic Development and its Relations with the West,” 110. 
10 Lilia Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, trans. Antonina Bouis (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2003), 150-151. 
11 Rutland, “Shifting Sands: Russia’s Economic Development and its Relations with the West,” 110. 
5 
list of foreign policy priorities.  As much as the Russians wanted to be viewed as equals, 
they were no longer a preeminent concern for the White House.12 
Despite Russian optimism, the Putin and Bush administrations got off to a rocky 
start.  Russia was unhappy with the United States’ desire to withdraw from the 1972 
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and its disapproval of the Chechen conflict.  The 
United States’ criticism on the lack of free speech and charges about Russia being unable 
to control the proliferation of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were also points of 
contention.  Russia accused the US of unilateralism, of “breaking down the structure of 
international treaties on strategic arms control and starting a new nuclear arms race, of 
interference in Russia’s domestic affairs, and double-standards in the treatment of 
Russia.”13  Many Russians felt Americans were intentionally trying to keep Russia weak 
by preventing its entry into international organizations seen as necessary for economic 
development, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), and by criticizing its policy 
of trade with countries such as Iran.14 
These issues were all momentarily set aside on 11 September 2001, when 
President Putin called President Bush to offer his condolences.  He went on to pledge his 
country’s support saying, “in the name of Russia, I want to say to the American people—
we are with you.”15  A joint statement issued on 21 October 2001 reaffirmed Russia’s 
condemnation of the terrorist attacks and the United States’ and Russia’s readiness to 
work together to “fight this deadly challenge through active cooperation and 
coordination.”16  Subsequently, Russia joined the US-led coalition committed to fighting 
the global war on terrorism and US-Russian relations moved into a new phase.     
When faced with a national tragedy, sympathetic rhetoric from foreign leaders is 
expected; the actual assistance Russia provided as part of the anti-terrorist coalition is a 
                                                 
12 Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, 152-154. 
13 Belkin, 3. 
14 Celeste A. Wallander, “The Multiple Dimensions of Russian Threat Assessment,” PONARS Policy 
Memo 199, April 2001. 
15 Jill Dougherty, “9/11 a 'turning point' for Putin,” 10 September 2002 [on-line]; available from 
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/09/10/ar911.russia.putin/; Internet; accessed 4 March 2004. 
16 “Joint Statement on Counterterrorism by the President of the United States and the President of 
Russia,” 21 October 2001. 
6 
better gauge of Russia’s sincerity.  Russian contributions to the US-led war in 
Afghanistan were significant, even though no direct military support was supplied.  
Russian leaders began by standing down troops and canceling strategic bomber and 
missile exercises scheduled for mid-September in response to America’s heightened state 
of readiness.17  They helped build relations between the US and Afghanistan’s Northern 
Alliance and shared intelligence that was especially helpful due to their familiarity with 
fighting the Taliban.18  Russia increased support to the anti-Taliban United Front, 
equipping them with more arms—including tanks, armored personnel carriers, 
reconnaissance vehicles, and infantry fighting vehicles.19  It also allowed the US to ship 
American ammunition and other supplies via rail from ports in Northern Europe to 
Central Asia even though it meant having a large US contingent on Russian soil.20   
Russia also contributed to the effort by providing humanitarian assistance, leading 
reconstruction efforts, and manning hospitals.  To date Russia has transported more than 
420,296 tons of food commodities, 2,198 tons of medical supplies, and various other 
amounts of beds, heaters, tents, bedding, kitchen utensils, and detergents.  Russia 
provided personnel to reconstruct the Salang tunnel, effectively reconnecting the northern 
and southern provinces of Afghanistan.  They also provided the first coalition hospital in 
Kabul at the end of November 2001 and treated over six thousand patients before turning 
it over to the local population in January 2002.21  In a more indirect way, Russia 
contributed to coalition readiness by maintaining a stable and affordable supply of oil and 
gas to the international market when OPEC moved to reduce the supply of oil.22   
                                                 
17 Rouben Azizian, “A Marriage of Convenience: Russia and US Foreign Policy,” Asian Affairs, an 
American Review 30 (Summer 2003): 151. 
18 Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, 207. 
19 Thomas Withington, “The Other Allies: Russia, India, and Afghanistan’s United Front,” Current 
History 101 (January 2002): 43. 
20 Michael Moran and Robert Windrem, “New Russia-US War Ties Revealed,” [on-line]; available 
from http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/6527-2.cfm; Internet; accessed on 7 March 2004. 
21 U.S. Central Command, “International Contributions to the War on Terrorism,” [on-line]; available 
from http://www.centcom.mil/Operations/Coalition; Internet; accessed on 4 March 2004. 
22 Oksana Antonenko, “Fighting Terrorism: For the US and Russia, One War but Two Agendas,” [on-
line]; available from http://www.carnegie.org/reporter/04/backpage/russia.html; Internet; accessed on 25 
February 2004. 
7 
The Russians made an extremely important contribution when they overcame 
their reservations about allowing US troops within their traditional sphere of influence.  
Russia did not object when the Central Asian nations decided to support the US on 
various levels.  All the governments in the region gave the coalition blanket overflight 
rights; some also provided emergency landing rights, while others, including Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan offered the coalition basing rights.23  The assistance provided by each of 
the Central Asian nations proved to be invaluable to coalition efforts in Afghanistan and 
would have been challenging without Russian cooperation.  The level of collaboration is 
especially impressive given Russia’s usual reticence toward tolerating strong unilateral 
action, especially within its sphere of influence.  US Secretary of State Colin Powell said 
it best when he praised Russian contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom, “stating 
that Russia had been ‘a key member’ of the international antiterrorist coalition and had 
played ‘a crucial role’ in the coalition’s success ‘by providing intelligence, bolstering the 
Northern Alliance, and assisting our entry into Central Asia.’”24 
On that note, US-Russian relations continued to improve through 2001 and the 
beginning of 2002.  Meetings between Presidents Bush and Putin led to several positive 
developments, including cooperation on the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty and 
recognition of Russia as a market economy and full member in the G8.25  As 2002 
progressed and the US began seriously considering military action in Iraq, relations once 
again became strained.  The US was concerned with Russia’s resumption of trade 
negotiations with Iraq and expansion of nuclear assistance to Iran.  Russia felt it was 
conceding on too many issues, including US presence in Central Asia, NATO 
enlargement, and ABM treaty withdrawal, and not getting enough deliverables in return.  
The lines of communication were open, but Russia remained suspicious of US action and 
unilateralism and no real effort was put forth to strengthen the strategic core of the 
relationship.26 
                                                 
23 US Department of State, Office of Central Affairs, “US Policy in Central Asia: Frequently Asked 
Questions,” 20 November 2002 [on-line]; available from 
http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/eur/eurasia/centralasia-faq-112002.htm; Internet; accessed on 7 March 
2004. 
24 Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, 207. 
25 Belkin, 8-10. 
26 Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, 232-234, 247. 
8 
A new test for US-Russian relations emerged as the US solidified plans for action 
in Iraq.  American and Russian foreign policy and economic interests openly diverged for 
the first time since September 11th.  Russia opposed war without UN support; however, 
when the US invaded Iraq, Putin said that although Russia’s position had not changed, 
US defeat was not in Russia’s interest.  At the same time, the United States was far less 
critical of Russia than it was of France or Germany with respect to the controversy over 
Iraq.  The US and Russia still had to continue work on several other important issues in 
the realm of terrorism and non-proliferation.  Russia’s decision not to support US-action 
in Iraq and its continuing interest in strengthening bilateral ties left many analysts 
uncertain about Russia’s strategic objectives.27   Discovering the person or group that has 
the ability to make or influence foreign policy decisions is a critical part of understanding 
Russian objectives.   
2.   Sources of Russian Foreign Policy 
Several factors affect how foreign policy is created; among those factors are the 
type of government or structure of the state, the various political groups in existence, and 
the strength of the state versus society.  Political parties were and continue to be an 
underdeveloped part of the Russian government and thus, are not effective at elevating 
and representing the foreign policy positions of the public.  In addition, the Parliament 
lacks mechanisms for influencing the foreign policy aspect of executive power.  There is 
also an absence of well-established, influential organizations and interest groups.  A 
system without strong political parties and interest groups often lends itself, as it has with 
Russia, to giving the president carte-blanche to conduct foreign policy.   
During the nineties, the political elite did play a larger role in forming foreign 
policy.  The elite included military leaders, influential members of Parliament, and the 
oligarchs; however, these people were more inclined to look out for their own interests 
rather than representing the citizens of Russia.  Russian foreign policy appeared to 
complement the interests of whichever group within the elite held more sway in the 
                                                 
27 Paul J. Saunders, “The U.S. and Russia after Iraq,” Policy Review 119 (June/July 2003): 30-31. 
9 
president’s circle at a particular time.  This helps explain the often erratic shifts in 
policy—as the favored elite changed, so did the policies.28   
More recently and in line with the super-presidential system currently in place, 
the power to formulate foreign policy rests almost solely in the hands of the Russian 
president.  The 2000 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation clearly states that 
“the President of the Russian Federation, in conformity with his constitutional powers, 
shall provide guidance of the country’s foreign policy and as the Head of State shall 
represent the Russian Federation in international relations.”  The other body’s mentioned, 
such as the State Duma, the Security Council, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are 
there to “support,” “execute,” and “provide direct implementation” of the course set by 
the President of the Russian Federation.29  In this case, high approval ratings in public 
opinion polls legitimize the president’s actions and allow him to act as he desires in the 
realm of foreign policy.  
After September 11th, President Putin made a choice to favor the West and 
support US action in Afghanistan; however, Russia’s political class was ambivalent about 
his decision.  Even those in his entourage expressed their lack of desire to join the anti-
terrorist coalition or participate in the war in Afghanistan. 30  Most of the political elite 
felt that 9/11 had not transformed the world; all the old problems, from disagreements 
about the Balkans to the United States’ desire to withdraw from the ABM treaty, still 
existed and the attacks were simply an “appalling outcome of America’s own foreign 
policy.”31  The military also voiced opposition and was reluctant to endorse the presence 
of US troops in Central Asia.32   
Various levels of support and dissent toward a policy of assisting the US in 
Afghanistan were evident during the debates in the fall 2001 session of the State Duma.  
                                                 
28 Alexei Salmin, “Domestic Actors and the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,” in Russia and 
the West at the Millennium, eds. Medvedev, Konovalov, and Oznobishchev (George C. Marshall European 
Center for Security Studies, 2003), 76.  
29 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. 
30 Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, 205-206. 
31 Dmitri Trenin, “America’s Anti-Terrorist Campaign and Russia’s Choice,” 19 September 2001 [on-
line]; available from http://ceip.org/files/Publications/treninrussiachoice.asp?from+pubdate; Internet; 
accessed on 7 February 2004. 
32 Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, 206. 
10 
The Yabloko Party, a mainly pro-Western faction, was in favor of doing everything 
possible to cooperate with the US against international terrorists.  The Union of Right 
Forces advocated close collaboration with the US.  The pro-president centrist groups 
closely followed the official Kremlin position of a cautious approach toward cooperation.  
The Communist Party leader objected to any proposals about collaboration.  The leaders 
of the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) opposed even sympathizing 
with the US and actually suggested cooperating with the Islamic world instead.  But 
President Putin had made his decision; Russia would provide intelligence support and 
other aid to the coalition, but there would be no direct military participation.  The Russian 
Parliament eventually reached a consensus in line with Putin’s views and passed a 
resolution that gave the president moral and political support.33  This was the first time 
President Putin acted against the advice of the political elite. 
Even though there is a lack of political advocacy to accompany public opinion, it 
still plays a role in the Russian government.  Part of the reason the president was able to 
act as he saw fit and without immediate support from the political elite was his extremely 
high public approval rating.  The president’s approval rating had been in the seventieth 
percentile since March of 2001.34  In terms of public opinion directly related to the 
situation in Afghanistan, fifty percent of the population saw the Taliban as a threat to 
world civilization in October 2001.  In a survey completed in September 2001, the 
majority of Russians preferred to stay neutral in the conflict between NATO and the 
Muslim world.  In the same survey, of those people that did choose to support one side, 
twenty percent supported backing NATO and breaking ties with the Muslim world (Iran, 
Iraq, Afghanistan) and only five percent endorsed giving moral support to the Muslim 
world.  Another survey done in October/November 2001 showed that slightly more 
Russians agreed with US and British military action in Afghanistan than opposed it.35   
Supporting the coalition in Afghanistan without engaging in direct military action 
                                                 
33 Vladimir Rukavishnikov, “The Russian Perception of the American ‘War on Terror,’” (Copenhagen 
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allowed President Putin to stay within the acceptable bounds of public opinion and keep 
his approval rating high.   
September 11th provided the US and Russia with a common threat and an 
opportunity to cooperate.  With a somewhat surprising shift in foreign policy, Russia 
expressed its support for America’s proposed military action in Afghanistan.  These 
changes in Russian foreign policy did not come without resistance, especially from the 
political elite; however, one of the most popular Russian leaders ever was able to 
transform policy and deliver much needed intelligence, humanitarian aid, and support in 
Central Asia to coalition forces without losing public support.   
 
C.   METHODOLOGY 
US-Russian relations were on a decline prior to 9/11, and the majority of Russia’s 
political elite were not in favor of actively supporting the US after the attacks.  The 
obvious follow-on question is:  what motivated Putin to make an unexpected shift to the 
West?  This thesis answers that question by evaluating three likely explanations for 
Russia’s decisions in the war on terrorism:  the desire to balance US unilateralism, to gain 
support for “anti-terrorist” action in Chechnya, and to advance the nation’s economic 
interests.  The next three chapters examine the possible role each of these factors played.  
This is done using multiple within-case comparisons, where the dependent variables are 
Russia’s decision to support OEF and its decision not to support OIF.  The independent 
variables include advancing national economic interests, gaining approval of fighting in 
Chechnya, and balancing US power.  These variables are individually assessed to see if 
expected gains covary with Russia’s decision to support and potential losses correlate 
with Russia’s decision to oppose the war on terrorism.  
The analysis in chapters two through four evaluates Russian foreign policy and 
US-Russian relations within the context of the war on terrorism.  The final chapter uses 
those results to draw conclusions about the national interests that are currently guiding 
Russian foreign policy and then applies them to the broader framework of general US-
Russian  relations.   The  study  also  exposes  challenges  and  future possibilities for US- 
12 
Russian relations and reveals the true nature of the US-Russian relationship.  The final 
portion of Chapter V suggests ways in which the US can build a stronger partnership with 




























II. ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY IN THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM 
Russia’s struggle to move from a state-planned economy to a market-based 
economy began with the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Although the economy has 
improved significantly over the past four years, the conversion is still not complete.  The 
battle to stabilize and diversify the economy, while increasing the standard of living for 
Russian citizens continues today—two years after Russia was officially declared a market 
economy by the European Union (EU) and US in the summer of 2002.   
President Putin has made it clear that the economy is one of his main priorities.  
With a quarter of the Russian population still living below the poverty line, low levels of 
foreign investment, and high levels of crime, corruption, capital flight and 
unemployment, it is obvious why.  In his 2000 national address, Putin emphasized the 
persistent problem of “economic weakness [in] Russia” stating, “The growing gap 
between industrialized countries and Russia is pushing us into the ranks of Third World 
countries.”36  With Putin’s clearly declared goal of reviving the economy and a foreign 
policy concept that “stipulates the domination of internal goals over external ones,” the 
role the economy plays in the Russian decision-making process must be evaluated.37  In 
particular, understanding how national economic priorities affect Russian foreign policy 
is critical. 
 
A. TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY 
When Russia first became an independent nation, Western advisors swept in to 
help start an extensive overhaul of the Communist economic system.  The advisors 
encouraged Russia to pursue policies in line with the “Washington Consensus,” including 
price and trade liberalization, financial stabilization, and privatization.  Unfortunately, 
many of these changes were implemented in a sudden and radical manner, in line with the 
notion of shock therapy, and did not account for the many underlying characteristics of 
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both Russian society and institutions.  In the early nineties, Russians had limited 
experience with creating and maintaining macroeconomic policies and no established 
central bank to manage interest rates.  Subsidies in both enterprises and consumer goods 
were widespread and property rights were overwhelmingly underdeveloped.  The Russian 
public may have grasped the physical benefits of a market economy, but did not 
understand what it would take to get there.38  Another contributing factor in the overall 
economic situation was Russia’s assumption of all Soviet era debt. These conditions of 
limited indigenous expertise, no groundwork for building lasting economic institutions, 
and rampant corruption were bound to make a rapid transition more difficult. 
Looking back, it is apparent that the Western advisors underestimated the 
complexity of converting Russia’s command-administered economy into a working 
market economy.  Poor appraisals of the overall situation led to decisions that generated 
hyperinflation when prices were freed overnight, corrupt privatization with those in 
positions of power taking control of the most lucrative enterprises, and policies of deficit 
financing.  Eventually things spiraled out of control and ended in the 1998 financial 
crisis.39 
Russia began on its path toward economic recovery in 1999.  Two factors that 
contributed significantly in the beginning were the devaluation of the ruble and high 
energy prices; however, exchange rates and natural resource prices are, by nature, 
unpredictable and cannot be relied upon for long-term economic improvements.40  This 
reliance on the export of raw materials to keep the economy afloat created a skewed 
export-import structure.  Energy resource and metal exports increased, while technology 
and manufacturing exports decreased.  The domestic market became saturated with 
foreign consumer goods, which made it more difficult for domestic manufacturers to 
break into the market.  Russia also continued to experience other problems, such as 
capital flight and low foreign direct investment, due to the lack of emphasis on creating 
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and enforcing government policies and the rule of law.41  Although some positive 
changes occurred in the years immediately following the 1998 financial crisis, Russia still 
had a long way to go on the road to creating a market economy. 
In a US National Intelligence Council report released in 2000, predictions about 
Russia’s ability to reform its economic and political systems were far from positive.  
Managing the negative legacies of the Soviet period, in both Russia and the Eurasian 
states, was predicted to be a major factor.  Economic challenges, such as “insufficient 
structural reform, poor productivity in agriculture as compared with Western standards, 
decaying infrastructure, environmental degradation…corruption and organized crime,” 
were expected to cause these nations to fall further behind the West and major emerging 
markets, especially with the rapid pace of technological and scientific innovation and 
globalization.42  Russia’s projected population decline of ten to fifteen million by 2015 
was also cited as a significant problem with the capacity to stunt industrial growth.  These 
factors together were expected to diminish the “centrality” of Russia and impede its 
ability to project power beyond the former Soviet republics to the South.43 
These sort of bleak predictions left Russians scrambling to identify ways to 
prevent the predicted decline of their global power.  It has become increasingly apparent 
that President Putin views economic growth as the way to rebuild the country and 
maintain global power and influence.  In 2000, Putin stated, “A stable economy is the 
main guarantee of a democratic society and the cornerstone of a strong and respected 
state.”  Over the past four years, Putin’s emphasis on the economy has only grown 
stronger.   
 
B. CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION 
During his first term, President Putin laid out some ambitious economic goals in 
an effort to push reforms.  He challenged the nation to work toward doubling the gross 
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domestic product (GDP) by 2012 and cutting poverty in half by 2007.44  This was 
reinforced in his latest address to the Federal Assembly of Russia, when he stated, “Our 
main goal, I repeat, is to bring about a noticeable rise in our people’s prosperity.”45  As of 
June 2004, Russia was “continuing on a path of brisk economic development.”46  First 
quarter growth for 2004 was measured at 7.4 percent and economic activity has finally 
branched out from the natural resource sectors.  For the first time in two years, the fuel 
and energy sector did not report the highest growth rates of the industrial production sub-
sectors, making it apparent that production outside the core resource industries is 
growing.  Fixed capital investment grew 12.8 percent from January to May 2004 and 
there were general improvements in investor sentiment about Russia.  Macroeconomic 
policies appeared to be well-managed in the first months of 2004 as well.47 
However, Russian economic reform is far from finished and many difficulties 
have yet to be resolved.  According to the World Bank’s “Russian Economic Report,” 
three major obstacles still exist:  dependence on high export prices for oil and gas, a 
reform gap between statements and implementation in areas such as privatization, state 
monopolies, and public administration, and issues of governance, including setting and 
enforcing the rule of law.  The report asserts that even with expansion in the industrial 
sector, the economy is not diverse enough to protect against oil price volatility.  This 
drives further concerns about Russia’s balance of payments and the reliance on external 
factors, such as hydrocarbon prices, to maintain the current budget surplus.  Thus, long-
term investment in Russia’s real sectors is still considered very risky; this is reflected in 
the modest influx of foreign direct investment. 48   Russia’s share of global investment 
GDP is about twenty percent; other middle-income and low-income countries average 
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higher shares, about twenty-three percent.49  Capital flight also continues to plague the 
economy.  Putin is intimately aware of these problems.  During his May 2004 address, he 
focused on the actions needed to overcome them and reach the stated economic goals of 
doubling the GDP and reducing poverty.  Some of the objectives laid out in that address 
include budget reform with set policy objectives and expected outcomes, creating a more 
effective tax system that prevents opportunities for tax evasion, and establishing a 
balanced macroeconomic policy capable of reducing inflation and making a fully 
convertible ruble.  He also stressed the importance of building an effective system for 
using natural resources and a more modern infrastructure, including roads and oil and gas 
pipelines.50 
Economic reform is clearly one of Russia’s top domestic priorities.  It is important 
to uncover how this domestic matter may influence Russian foreign policy.  If President 
Putin’s recent rhetoric is any indication of the importance of economic concerns in 
foreign policy, then the relationship is quite close.  In his address to the Federal 
Assembly, he emphasized the “need to use the tools of foreign policy for a more 
appreciable practical return in the economy, and in the realization of important national 
tasks.”51  In another address to the Russian Federation ambassadors, Putin stated, 
“Russian diplomacy should help tackle national tasks more energetically than ever 
before.” 52  Raising economic competitiveness, integration into the world economy, 
raising investment attractiveness, and resisting discrimination in foreign markets are 
among the national tasks he stressed.53 
It is necessary to examine recent foreign policy decisions in order to determine if 
this rhetoric holds true and foreign policy decisions are being made based on national 
economic priorities.  The next section will consider the decisions made with respect to 
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the war on terrorism to determine if economic considerations were a significant part of 
the decision-making process. 
 
C. RUSSIAN ECONOMY AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM 
1. Operation Enduring Freedom 
There is little doubt the economy was on President Putin’s mind when he decided 
to side with the West in Operation Enduring Freedom.  It was one of his main 
considerations in most national policy decisions.  Just how economically beneficial a pro-
West stance would be was probably questionable, but Putin could have been fairly certain 
that it would not hurt Russian economy.  If nothing else, Afghanistan had been a source 
of instability in the region for years; if coalition troops could secure the source of 
instability, the long-term pay off could be substantial.  Increasing stability in the region 
could improve Russia’s economic situation in several ways, including opening new 
markets, reducing losses due to smuggling and black market activities, and decreasing the 
need for additional border security personnel.   
A stable regional environment would allow the former Soviet Central Asian 
republics to put less emphasis on security and more energy into creating governments 
capable of enforcing the rule of law and building strong economies.  The Russian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs asserted that the steady and harmonious political and 
socioeconomic development of the Central Asian states will benefit Russia by opening 
new and growing markets.54  The other potential market is in Afghanistan.  With a shift 
from illicit to legal means of employment, the country has the potential to open up and 
eventually become a new market for Russian exports.  The current coalition efforts to 
improve health care, education, and security will contribute to making Afghanistan a 
new, potentially lucrative market.  On-going projects to expand roads and increase other 
infrastructure will also make trade more feasible.  This new market is already starting to 
take shape.  In 2002, Foreign Minister Ivanov and the Afghan interim government leader, 
Hamid Karzai signed seventeen memoranda on cooperation between the Russian and 
Afghan ministries, agencies, and business circles.  These accords “concern mostly 
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construction and restoration of Afghanistan’s infrastructure facilities, oil and gas fields, 
energy facilities, as well as deliveries of Russian-made agricultural machinery, industrial 
equipment, and various types of hardware” according to Ivanov.55 
Increasing stability in the region may also benefit Russia and the Central Asian 
nations by decreasing smuggling.  A 1997 study estimated the smuggling trade in the 
region, including Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Iran, and Pakistan, to amount to 
approximately five billion dollars.  Black market trading has wreaked havoc on local 
industry in the affected states.  Local factories are not able to compete with the price of 
smuggled, foreign-made, duty-free goods.  This also generates huge losses in customs 
revenues and sales taxes.  Creating a more stable environment and less porous borders 
will allow Russia and the Central Asian countries to decrease the resources required to 
protect their borders against drug and weapon trafficking and raids from Islamic 
fundamentalists.56 
Expediting entry into several key economic institutions may also have been at the 
forefront of President Putin’s mind when he was considering supporting OEF.   His 
decision did result in closer economic cooperation in many instances.  It reopened 
discussions with the European Union, which had become frustrated with issues 
surrounding Chechnya.57  In May 2002, President Bush verbally expressed a desire for 
Russia to enter the WTO, with the stipulation that Russia conform to the rules and 
continue to reform its economy.58  Later that summer, both the EU and the US 
Commerce Department granted Russia market economy status.  Although Russia’s 
designation as a market economy is more of a political incentive, it will help with WTO 
entry negotiations and also allows the reduction of taxes on Russian exports to both 
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Europe and the US.59  Being identified as a market economy should also help attract 
foreign investment into priority areas in the Russian economy.  In addition, Russia was 
promised full membership in the G8 and in 2002, was granted the right to host the 2006 
G8 summit.  Russia has been a member of the G8 and part of political discussions since 
1998; however, it was excluded from the financial meetings until full membership was 
granted.60  There is no doubt that Russia’s participation in the anti-terrorist coalition 
made its presence in all aspects of the G8 necessary—even though Russia has not yet 
attained a powerful, competitive economy.61   
Another key economic issue is centered on oil.  Russia assisted the coalition and 
also helped itself when it refused to acquiesce to OPEC demands to reduce production 
and export of oil.  This act helped shield the US and Western economies from the 
negative effects of increased energy costs during the fall of 2001.62  When Moscow did 
finally submit to OPEC pressure, it was for the “token export reduction of 150,000 
barrels per day for the winter quarter.”63  This reduction reflected normal seasonal cuts 
due to winter port restrictions.  This act of solidarity with the West gained Russia positive 
recognition and the hope of becoming an alternate source of oil for its coalition partners.  
In a November 2001 visit to Russia, US Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham remarked 
that Russia appeared to be “emerging as a separate nucleus of the energy equation.”64  
This was followed by a new US-Russian Energy Dialogue begun in May 2002 which 
“created a venue for cooperation and a means of reducing Western dependence on OPEC 
oil.”65  Supporting the coalition provided President Putin with an opportunity to open 
new oil export markets and enhance relations with existing customers.  Much of Russia’s 
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GDP is based on the export of oil and other natural resources, so this was an important 
step in advancing Russia’s economic interests. 
2.   Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Economic factors were also an important consideration for President Putin when 
deciding whether or not to support an invasion of Iraq.  Russia opposed the US draft UN 
resolution on Iraq and disagreed with military action against Saddam’s regime.  When 
Russia realized it was impossible to stop the US from pursuing its objectives in Iraq, it 
tried to secure guarantees that Russia’s economic interests would be protected if it did not 
obstruct the US policy.  Eventually, Russia agreed to support a revised resolution that 
required Iraq to declare all weapons of mass destruction and allow UN inspections.66  
Russia did not, however, support a second Security Council resolution to allow the use of 
force in Iraq.   
Russia was obviously opposed to Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Its rationale for 
countering the US resolutions becomes clear when examining the potential monetary 
losses Russia would face as a result of Saddam’s fall.  Russia has maintained a major 
economic presence in Iraq, a Soviet client state in the 1970s and 1980s.  In fact, Russia 
remained a major trading partner for Iraq, even under UN sanctions.67  Iraqis purchased 
Russian exports, including Volga cars and grain harvesters, which could not be sold in 
any other markets.  These exports equated to nearly $187 million in 2001, and reached 
over $61 million in the first quarter of 2002.68  Russia was also Iraq’s main supplier of 
weapons and military equipment.  It is highly likely that numerous shipments of military 
equipment, including night vision goggles, anti-tank missiles, and GPS jamming devices, 
were sold in violation of UN sanctions.  Russian technicians were often hired to run 
power  plants,  manag e factories,  and  build  railroads.69   By the time the US decided to  
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invade Iraq, Russia held $8 billion in Iraqi debt.  Russia was concerned the debt would 
not be repaid if the regime changed and was upset by suggestions about forgiving the 
debt after it did change.70 
The Russians were also worried about the monetary losses they would face with 
the end of the oil-for-food program.  Under the program, proceeds from oil sales were 
restricted in how they could be spent.  This benefited Russian businesses and helped them 
profit in two ways—by being exporters of Iraqi oil and by being authorized suppliers of 
goods under the program.  By the beginning of 2003, Russian firms possessed $4 billion 
worth of approved, but outstanding contracts under the oil-for-food program.  It is highly 
unlikely that Russia will be able to obtain nearly as many or as profitable contracts after 
the war.71   
Russian businesses also discussed, initialed, or signed numerous contracts with 
Iraq regarding the development of Iraqi oil fields; however, the contracts could not be 
recognized until UN economic sanctions against Iraq were lifted.  Because these 
contracts were discussed under Saddam’s regime and sanctions were not lifted until after 
the US invasion, Russian contracts do not have to be honored.  The new Iraqi government 
has now been given the power to decide who gets contracts to develop their oil fields.  
This has led to a significant outcry by LUKoil who claims the contracts should be 
honored regardless of regime change.72  LUKoil purportedly negotiated a $4 billion, 
twenty-three year contract to rehabilitate the West Qurna oil field.73  This is obviously 
another potential source of financial losses for Russia and a reason it resisted OIF.  An 
additional concern for Russia regarding oil is the possibility of Iraqi oil production 
capacity increasing now that UN sanctions have been lifted.  Increased oil production 
could drive the price of oil down.  This would be extremely bad for the Russian economy 
considering its dependence on oil prices.  A one dollar decrease in the price of a barrel of 
oil results in approximately a .35 percent drop in the Russian GDP.74   
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President Putin obviously knew the potential negative impacts of a US invasion 
and an Iraqi regime change on the Russian economy; this knowledge likely played a large 
role in his decision not to support Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Putin also recognized the 
potential political impacts.  His public support and high public opinion ratings are largely 
a result of low inflation, a balanced budget, prompt payments, and an increased standard 
of living made possible by a growing economy.  It is in Putin’s direct political interest to 
ensure continued growth of a strong economy.75  
 
D.  CONCLUSION 
There is little doubt that President Putin evaluated the economic impact prior to 
his decision to support OEF and OIF.  Although it would be impossible to anticipate the 
exact responses of coalition governments, Putin could be fairly certain that a pro-Western 
stance in OEF would help him attain or at least expedite certain economic objectives.  
The result is that Russian support for military action in Afghanistan did or will, in the 
future, benefit Russia economically.  These benefits can be seen in the increased 
economic integration of Russia during 2002-03, the possible opening of new markets due 
to regional stability, and the prospect of becoming a stabilizing force in the oil market.  
President Putin also knew that a US invasion of Iraq would likely harm Russian 
economic interests.  The loss of special trading relationships with Iraq, the loss of 
numerous lucrative oil contracts, and the possible politically-forced reduction of Iraqi 
debt would all lead to economic losses.   
Russia has spent the last decade and a half striving to build a strong, viable market 
economy with the hope of being integrated into the international environment as a major 
industrial democracy.  A strong economy is seen as the vehicle for achieving a better 
standard of living for Russian citizens and for assuming Russia’s rightful place among 
the major powers.  These sentiments have translated into the economy being elevated to a 
top national priority.  More recently, the economy also appears to be driving more 
decisions in the foreign policy arena.  Putin’s rhetoric about Russian society being able to 
see the practical results of work in the international sphere certainly point to the idea that 
                                                 
75 Wallander, “Russia’s Interest in Trading with the ‘Axis of Evil,’” 4. 
24 
the “line between domestic and foreign policy is becoming thinner.”76  The intertwining 
of foreign policy decisions and national economic priorities is evident in the decisions 
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III. RUSSIAN-CHECHEN CONFLICT AND THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM 
The situation in Chechnya is complex with a multitude of actors and mixed 
agendas.  Over time, the conflict has evolved from a purely separatist movement to one 
that incorporates Islamic extremist ideals and jihad.  Initially, most of the international 
community failed to recognize this transformation.  It was not until the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, that the rest of the world finally began to accept that Russia was 
dealing with more than just a nationalistic republic.  Chechnya has caused tension 
between Russia and the West for some time, mainly due to the alleged human rights 
abuses by Russian troops.  Thus, it is important to examine this very political issue to 
determine if obtaining support for the war in Chechnya and quieting international 
criticism played a significant role in Russian foreign policy decisions in the war on 
terrorism. 
 
A. EVOLUTION OF THE RUSSIAN-CHECHEN CONFLICT 
Relations between the Russians and Chechens have been infused with conflict for 
centuries.  Russia first attempted to establish control over the North Caucasus in the 
sixteenth century by making the Chechens vassals of Muscovy.77  The Chechens resisted 
Russian occupation of their territory throughout the eighteenth century, but were finally 
incorporated into the Russian empire in 1864 after losing the brutal, forty-seven-year 
Caucasian War (1817-1864).78  The people of the North Caucasus continued their passive 
opposition until 1917, when they unsuccessfully attempted to reassert their independence 
following the October Revolution.  In 1944, Stalin ordered the deportation of the entire 
Chechen nation to Central Asia for allegedly collaborating with the Germans.79  
Approximately 200,000 Chechens died from hunger and disease during this time.80  This 
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history of resistance, war, and persecution helps explain the rapid emergence of a 
Chechen separatist movement during the fall of the Soviet Union. 
In late 1990, the Chechen National Congress convened and began discussing the 
secession of Chechnya from the USSR.  In 1991, the congress officially announced that 
the Chechen portion of the Chechen-Ingushetia Republic would secede.  A former Soviet 
general, Dzokhar Dudayev, was elected president of Chechnya in October and 
immediately reconfirmed the earlier declaration of independence.  In November, in 
response to the proclamation of independence, Russian President Boris Yeltin issued a 
decree declaring emergency rule in Chechnya.  Russian troops were sent to an airport 
near Grozny, but left soon after arriving because the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet 
refused to back Yeltsin’s decision to take military action.81   
In March 1992, all the autonomous republics of the former Soviet Union, except 
Chechnya and Tartarstan, signed a federation treaty.  At this point, the Russian 
Federation decided to recognize the Chechnya-Ingushetia split, but still refused to accept 
Chechen independence.  Without an effective governing body or police organization, 
Chechnya’s internal problems grew throughout the early nineties.82  The illegal drug and 
arms trades thrived.  Criminals fled into the republic, knowing they would not be 
extradited to Russia.  In addition, the Chechen mafia grew into one of the largest and 
most violent elements in the Russian criminal underworld.  Over time, Russia began to 
view Chechen rebels as a threat to its interests, which included preserving territorial 
integrity, preventing destabilization of the region, protecting oil pipelines and access to 
the Caspian Sea, and containing crime.83  Yeltsin made the decision to support the anti-
Dudayev opposition in 1994 after negotiations between the Chechen separatists and the 
Russian Federation repeatedly failed.  When the opposition forces were unsuccessful in 
their quest to take Grozny, Yeltsin deployed Russian troops to reassert Moscow’s power 
over the republic and restore “constitutional order.”84  
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In the beginning of the war, the Russian military performed poorly and 
experienced heavy losses.  This was due to improper planning, inadequate training, and 
an underestimation of the Chechens’ determination to defend their homeland.85  
Eventually, Russian forces managed to gain control of Grozny, but not without 
considerable civilian casualties, extreme brutality, and the devastation of numerous 
Chechen cities and villages.  As the war dragged on, Russian public support dwindled.  
By early 1996, the war was beginning to negatively affect Yeltsin’s chances for 
reelection.  As a result, Yeltsin announced a peace plan for Chechnya in a television 
address on March 31st.86   
The war finally ended in August 1996 with the signing of the Khasavyurt 
Accord.87  Chechnya was allowed its own constitution and control over financial and 
natural resources with the understanding that a final political status for Chechnya would 
be decided upon in five years.  By January 1, 1997, Russian troops had completely 
withdrawn from Chechen territory.88   
Although exact numbers are difficult to find, the losses experienced by both the 
Chechens and the Russians during the first war are staggering.  The official number of 
Russian servicemen who died during the 1994-1996 war is 5,500; however, the Soldiers’ 
Mothers of Russia argue that the actual number is closer to 14,000.  It is unclear whether 
or not the official numbers include the soldiers that died of their wounds in hospitals 
outside of Chechnya.89  Differing figures also exist for the number of Chechens killed 
during the war.  Anatoly Kulikov, the Russian Interior Minister at the time, stated that 
less than 20,000 civilians were killed.   Meanwhile, Secretary of the National Security 
Council Aleksandr Lebed claimed that between 80,000 and 100,000 Chechen people had  
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been killed and approximately 240,000 injured.90  The war also took a large toll on 
Chechen businesses.  One report estimates that eighty percent of Chechen industry was 
destroyed in the first war.91     
The war-torn republic faced numerous challenges as the period of Chechen self-
rule began.  The newly elected government, led by Aslan Maskhadov, was unable to 
effectively manage the republic.  Most Chechens became even more destitute as the 
power of warlords, radicals, and Islamic extremist groups increased.  It was at this time, 
during the mid-nineties, that the generally conventional, secular separatist movement 
evolved into an increasingly Islamic extremist movement.92  The change came as Islamic 
missionaries and fighters preaching jihad and Wahhabist traditions arrived in Chechnya 
and began forming terrorist organizations.93  These leaders came to Chechnya from 
places like Syria and Saudi Arabia and were interested in continuing the fight against the 
Russians that took place in Afghanistan during the eighties.  They saw an opportunity to 
exploit the separatist movement and arrived offering Chechens a new purpose in life 
based on “a form of their traditional Islam rooted in fundamentalism and militancy.”94  
They used money and the miserable conditions of war-torn Chechnya to attract people to 
their mosques and recruit them into their organizations.   
The Chechens had been struggling for independence for about five years by the 
time Islamic leaders began recruiting.  They had already been through one war and still 
had no definite agreement for an independent state; furthermore, Chechnya was 
becoming increasingly anarchic during the mid-nineties.  This left many Chechens 
searching for new solutions, and many turned to religion.  “At Friday Prayers, the 
mosques are packed with young people who say that feeling persecuted by their own 
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government only drives them deeper into Islam’s embrace.”95  Some people were looking 
for a new way, while others just wanted to avenge their dead relatives and their ruined 
homes.96  The Islamic leaders spouting jihad were able to claim success in Afghanistan 
against the Russians and sold their ideas under the guise that “holy war” could work for 
Chechnya as well.97   The Islamic fundamentalist leaders also brought along certain 
resources that enabled them to further their cause.  Russian intelligence officials estimate 
that approximately $25 million was donated to the separatists by Osama bin Laden.  
Other reports indicate that al Qaeda also provided weapons and instruction at Afghan 
training camps.98   
One of the more well-known leaders to relocate to Chechnya was Amir al-
Khattab, a fundamentalist who fought with bin Laden in Afghanistan.  He was able to 
convert Shamil Basayev, one of Chechnya’s best known militants, from a rebel Chechen 
freedom fighter to an Islamic fundamentalist fighting for freedom of the whole Arab 
world.  This change in ideology was instilled in separatist followers as they were drawn 
into Islamic terrorist organizations led by Basayev.  This shift in ideology became visible 
in 1999 when Khattab and Basayev led an incursion into Dagestan with the goal of 
driving out the Russians and merging Dagestan and Chechnya into a new Islamic state.99   
Shortly after the raids into Dagestan, a series of five bombings took place in 
Russia.  The first occurred on 31 August in the Manezhnaya shopping complex in central 
Moscow.  This was followed by an attack on a military housing facility in Dagestan.  The 
next three bombings targeted apartment buildings, two in Moscow and one in 
Volgodonsk.  Roughly three hundred people were killed and many more wounded in 
these bombings.  Although the circumstances surrounding the bombings were never fully 
explained, the Russian government was quick to accuse Chechen rebels.100  Vladimir 
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Putin, then Prime Minister, spoke of wiping out the “vermin” in Chechnya, while Russian 
military commanders wanted to “flatten the region.”101  In September 1999, the Russian 
military began a large-scale military campaign aimed at reasserting control over 
Chechnya.  Putin’s decisive action and promises to “destroy” the terrorists boosted his 
popularity considerably among the Russian people.  The hard line he took towards 
Chechnya helped him win the presidential election easily in 2000.102 
The second Chechen war has been just as brutal as the first.  Reports indicate that 
over 80,000 Chechens have been killed since the autumn of 1999.  The Soldiers’ Mothers 
of Russia estimate that 14,500 soldiers have died as a result of this war, although official 
numbers are much lower.103  The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) during 
2001 was approximately 430,000.104  Although that number has decreased significantly, 
the EU still reports 60,000 Chechen IDPs living in Ingushetia, 10,000 IDPs in Dagestan, 
and another 150,000 IDPs within Chechnya.105  Reports of human rights violations, 
including unlawful killings, abuse of civilians, and politically-motivated disappearances 
by both Russian troops and Chechen rebels, were prevalent during the second war.106 
Combat operations have officially ended and Russian officials claim the war is 
over, but the bloodshed continues on both sides.  Russian military “sweeps” supposedly 
result in civilian deaths, casualties, and abductions and Chechen rebels continue with 
their guerilla and terrorists tactics.  In October 2002, forty Chechen rebels seized a 
Moscow theater, taking eight hundred hostages and demanding that Russia withdraw its 
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troops from Chechnya.  Two months later, two truck bombs were used to strike a main 
administration building of the pro-Moscow Chechen government, killing eighty people 
and wounding many others.107  Prior to Beslan, the last major attack by Chechen rebels 
occurred on June 21, 2004 when an estimated two hundred fighters launched well-
coordinated attacks on twenty official facilities in the Russian region of Ingushetia.  The 
rebels, some of whom shouted “Alahu Akbar” (God is great) as they attacked, left at least 
fifty-eight people dead.108 
The latest round of attacks in the Russian-Chechen conflict is just another 
testament to the complexity of the situation.  It raises more questions about whether the 
fighting is still primarily a separatist movement or if the original purpose has been 
eclipsed by the greater international Islamic extremist movement.  The Chechens’ use of 
tactics employed frequently by jihadists, such as suicide bombings and extremist 
religious rhetoric, certainly lends credence to President Putin’s argument that Russia is 
waging war on international terrorism in the Caucasus; nevertheless, prior to September 
11, 2001, Putin had a difficult time convincing the West that the conflict was anything 
other than an ethno-political struggle.109  Therefore, it is important to consider whether or 
not Putin’s overtures after the terrorist attacks on the US were a way to gain support for 
Russia’s own battle against terrorism.  The next section will explore Russia’s 
involvement in the global war on terrorism to ascertain if the situation in Chechnya 
played an important role in the related foreign policy decisions. 
 
B. CHECHNYA AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM 
1. Operation Enduring Freedom 
President Putin insisted for quite some time that the conflict in Chechnya was an 
anti-terrorist war.  Since the beginning of his presidency, he had often called for other 
countries to join in the effort to fight terror.  After the attacks on the US, Putin cited 
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September 11th as proof that the West had failed to place the appropriate emphasis on the 
new threats of the modern world.110  He also began drawing parallels between the 
American and Russian struggles to battle terrorism.  President Putin was then able to 
enhance credibility in his views by signing onto the anti-terrorist coalition in support of 
OEF.111  Putin was able to further legitimize the war in Chechnya by making links, which 
the American government has acknowledged, between the Chechen rebels and al 
Qaeda.112   
Russia had more to gain by supporting Operation Enduring Freedom than just 
political legitimacy.  President Putin was also able to effectively decrease criticism from 
US and European leaders on human rights violations in Chechnya.  The Chechnya issue 
has been a source of conflict between Russia and the West for a while.  The military 
invasion of Chechnya in 1999 was initially strongly supported by the Russian public, but 
faced intense international criticism for purportedly killing tens of thousands of civilians 
and driving hundreds of thousands of Chechen refugees out of their homes.  Although the 
UN and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) acknowledged 
Russia’s right to resist separatism and terrorist threats on their territory, they disagreed 
with what appeared to be “disproportionate” and “indiscriminate” use of force.113  
Europe’s view of the situation was also evident in Russia’s delayed accession to the 
Council of Europe.  Russia’s membership was postponed until 1996 due to the first 
Chechen war; then, in 1999, when Russia invaded Chechnya again, Russia’s voting rights 
were revoked.114  The US was also extremely critical of Russian action in Chechnya prior 
to 11 September 2001.  In an interview in February 2000, then Governor George Bush 
stated that Russia was “handling the Chechnya situation in a way that’s not acceptable to 
peaceful nations” and that economic sanctions should be imposed until “they understand 
they need to resolve the dispute peacefully and not [by] bombing women and children.”  
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He suggested cutting off International Monetary Fund aid and export/import loans to 
Russia “until they heard the message loud and clear.”115   
By joining the US-led coalition and supporting OEF, “Putin managed to fold 
Chechnya into the US-led war on terrorism and largely escaped US government scrutiny 
and criticism for the Russian federal forces’ behavior in the rebellious province.”116  
Evidence of this is visible in President Bush’s comments in 2002.  Rather than 
advocating a cut in international aid and economic sanctions, Bush encouraged Putin to 
find a peaceful resolution while acknowledging that terrorists still needed to be held 
accountable.117  The United Nations and European Union also vacillated on Chechen 
human rights issues after September 11th.  The UN Human Rights Commission 
condemned Russia for violations in Chechnya by adopting resolutions in both 2000 and 
2001, but actually voted against a similar resolution on Chechnya in April 2002. 118  The 
EU drastically cut public criticism of Russia during this time as well.  Chechnya was 
reportedly discussed behind closed doors during two EU-Russia summits, but was not 
mentioned in any public statements.  Instead, leaders from both the UK and Germany 
praised President Putin’s leadership, while ignoring Russia’s failure to comply with 
previously approved EU and UN resolutions.  German Chancellor Schroeder went as far 
as to call for a “‘reevaluation’ of world opinion on the Chechnya conflict.”119 
Russia also benefited when Colin Powell designated three Chechen organizations 
as terrorists groups on February 14, 2003.  The Islamic International Brigade, the Special 
Purpose Islamic Regiment, and the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage 
Battalion of Chechen Martyrs were categorized as violent groups responsible for 
numerous terrorist acts in Russia and placed on the Specially Designated Global Terrorist 
(SDGT) list.  After being placed on the SDGT list, the groups became subject to 
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Executive Order 13244.  This executive order blocks all assets, located in the US or held 
by US citizen regardless of location, of those people or organizations listed.  It also 
prohibits any US citizens from making or receiving any contributions that would benefit 
those groups. 120  The three Chechen organizations were also added to the United 
Nations’ 1267 sanctions list in March 2003.  All UN member states were subsequently 
obliged to impose arms and travel sanctions on and freeze assets of those three 
organizations.121  These actions helped reduce outside funding to Chechen rebels.   
Russia also gained when the US physically attacked Afghanistan.  The United 
Front foreign minister provided Russia with evidence that Chechen rebels were using 
Afghanistan to train and resupply; the rebels had also established an embassy in Kabul 
and consulate in Kandahar.122  When coalition forces invaded Afghanistan, those training 
camps and terrorist links to the al Qaeda network were destroyed and could no longer 
produce new Chechen fighters.   
2.   Operation Iraqi Freedom 
In contrast to the returns the Russians received regarding the Chechen situation by 
supporting OEF, they did not reap any benefits with their stance toward Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  Rather than siding with the US, Russia supported France and Germany in their 
quest to oppose US action in Iraq.  Although the two Western European countries 
appreciated Russia’s backing, they were not willing to provide any special concessions in 
return.  Their condemnation of the situation in Chechnya certainly did not decrease; in 
fact, the EU became even more critical.  The EU tabled a resolution to the UN Human 
Rights Commission accusing Russia of violating human rights in Chechnya in April 
2003, in the midst of the war in Iraq.123   
Relatively little changed in the United States’ stance toward Russia.  The US 
decided not to co-sponsor the UN human rights resolution tabled by the EU; however, 
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President Bush has stated on several occasions that he is encouraging President Putin to 
seek a political solution to the Chechen conflict and prevent further human rights 
violations.  In one interview, the US president stated, “I think that Russia should be able 
to—or hope that Russia should be able to solve their issue with Chechnya peacefully. 
That's not to say that Vladimir shouldn't do what it takes to protect his people from 
individual terrorist attacks.”  He also said that the war on terrorism should be conducted 
“with respect for the human rights of minorities within countries.”124  Secretary of State 
Colin Powell expressed similar concerns about Russian policy in Chechnya in a January 
2004 article printed in Izvestia, a Russian newspaper.  He stated, “We recognize Russia’s 
territorial integrity and its natural interest in lands that abut it.  But we recognize no less 
the sovereign integrity of Russia’s neighbors and their rights to peaceful and respectful 
relations across their borders as well.”125  Russia did not “lose” by disapproving the US 
position towards Iraq, but critical remarks about Chechnya did appear to increase.  
Condoleeza Rice may have stated the US position regarding the opposition to OIF best.  
The US National Security Advisor reportedly urged the Bush administration to “punish 
France, ignore Germany, and forgive Russia.”126  This comment clearly points to the fact 
that even though Russia did not play by the US rules leading up to OIF, they were not 
punished.   
 
C. CONCLUSION 
Russia benefited by supporting OEF.  Not only did the amount of criticism 
regarding Russian actions and human rights violations in Chechnya decline, but Afghan 
training camps were destroyed and funding to rebels was cut off.  The war in Afghanistan 
also increased the potential for regional stability, while, at least temporarily, subduing the 
strong Islamic fundamentalist movement in Central Asia.  On the other hand, President 
Putin’s decision to oppose Operation Iraqi Freedom, did not necessarily help or hinder his 
cause in Chechnya.  The idea of gaining support for Russian action in Chechnya and a 
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partner in combating “terrorism” was surely a consideration when President Putin chose 
to support Operation Enduring Freedom; however, since the attention Putin sought for 
war against international terrorists had already been secured, the effect of his position in 
OIF on the Chechen situation was probably not a significant concern. 
The interactions between the United States and Russia during the war on terrorism 
may also help glean insight about US policy objectives.  The current US National 
Security Strategy (NSS) envisages several actions that will contribute to the overall NSS 
aim of making the world “not just safer but better.”127  Two of the objectives are to 
“champion aspirations for human dignity” and “strengthen alliances to defeat global 
terrorism.”128  These two US aspirations pose an interesting dilemma for American 
policymakers when addressing the present Chechen conflict.  As discussed, the US 
drastically decreased any criticism regarding human rights violations after Russia made 
the decision to support OEF.  Even more interesting is the fact little changed in the US 
attitude towards the Chechen situation when Russia opposed OIF.  If US actions in 
handling the Russia-Chechnya problem are any indication of actual hierarchy of policy 
objectives, then strengthening alliances for the global war on terrorism definitely 
outweighs “champion[ing] the cause of human dignity and oppos[ing] those who resist 
it.”129     
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IV.   BALANCING AND POWER IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 
During the Cold War era, the Soviet-US relationship could be accurately 
described using the realist notion of balance of power.  However, world politics and 
international relations were redefined when the Iron Curtain fell.  Many international 
relationships, including the US-Russian relationship, were transformed again after the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.  Americans and Russians were soon united in 
their efforts to combat terrorism.  The two nations cooperated in an unprecedented 
fashion during Operation Enduring Freedom, but disagreed about how to proceed with 
the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.  Russia even appeared to be balancing 
against US power when it joined Germany and France in opposing Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  It is necessary to understand how far Moscow is willing to go to counteract US 
hegemony and whether balancing against US unipolarity is a standard response in 
Russian decision-making.  Examining Russia’s actions during the US-led war on 
terrorism will help deduce whether or not counterbalancing the US is a continuing 
priority reflected in Russian foreign policy. 
 
A.   GLOBAL POWER, GLOBAL THREATS 
1. Balance in International Affairs 
Policymakers and international relations experts have been trying to understand 
the way the world works and more specifically, what causes nations to align with each 
other for centuries.  One of the most widely recognized and thoroughly debated theories 
is that of realism.  The realist theory of international relations “depicts international 
affairs as a struggle for power among self-interested states.”130  In particular, the 
behavior of major powers can be understood as a function of the global power structure 
and how they can best preserve or enhance their relative position in the overall 
distribution of power.131  The notion of balance of power evolved from these ideas to 
explain alliances in the international environment.  “The proposition that states will join 
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alliances in order to avoid domination by stronger powers lies at the heart of traditional 
balance of power theory.”132  Within this theory, alliances may be based on two different 
strategies—balancing or bandwagoning.  States that balance align with the weaker side to 
escape subjugation by the stronger power.  On the other hand, states that bandwagon join 
the stronger nation.133  This realist view of the world is structured solely in terms of 
power and expects the outcome of uncoordinated actions between states to be a balance 
of power in the international environment.134 
In “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” Stephen Walt argues 
that the balance of power notion is flawed “because it ignores the other factors that 
statesmen will consider when identifying potential threats and prospective allies.”135  He 
asserts that a more accurate assessment is that states align with or against the most 
threatening power.  This idea formed a new theory in which aggregate power is only one 
element of the threats that nations balance against.  In other words, a weaker power may 
be considered more dangerous or threatening for reasons other than its power capability.  
Factors other than aggregate power that must be considered include physical closeness, 
ability to attack, and aggressiveness.  Nations can respond to the threats by either 
balancing or bandwagoning.136  According to Walt, “for states that matter, balancing is 
the rule:  they will join forces against the threats posed by the power, proximity, 
offensive capabilities and intentions of others.”137 
The idea of balancing against threats instead of power is particularly relevant 
today in the face of international terrorism.  “The events of September 11, 2001, taught us 
that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as 
strong states.”138  Another quote from the US National Security Strategy reinforces the 
idea that factors other than aggregate power have become increasingly important.                                                   
132 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9 
(Spring 1985):  5. 
133 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA:  Addison Wesley, 1979), 126. 
134 Ibid., 118-122. 
135 Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” 8. 
136 Ibid., 8-9. 
137 Ibid., 18. 
138 U.S. President, Cover Letter, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
(September 2002).  
39 
“Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger 
America.  Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to 
our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank.”139  In the war on terrorism, 
offensive capability and intentions of state and non-state actors appear to be far more 
significant than national industrial and military power.  The nations of the world are no 
longer necessarily aligned against other states’ power because the threats to national 
security have changed.  That is not to say that the relative position of a nation in the 
global power structure has become completely insignificant.  For this reason it is 
necessary to understand the dynamics of the current international system and the changes 
that took place after the end of the Cold War. 
2.  Rise of US Unipolarity 
When the Soviet Union collapsed, many observers predicted that a new multipolar 
international system would emerge with centers of power in Asia, America, and Europe.  
This, however, is not what occurred; instead, the world’s only superpower, the United 
States, grew stronger.  From 1990 to 1998, the United States’ GDP increased twenty-
seven percent.  Growth rates for other industrialized areas, including Europe and Japan, 
during the same time were much lower.140  America has kept its leading economic 
position.  In 2003, the US GDP was greater than Japan’s, Germany’s, the United 
Kingdom’s, and France’s combined.141  The US has also maintained a high level of 
defense spending.  According to statistics from 2002, the United States allocated more 
money to defense spending than the next twelve nations combined.142  Without the 
constraints of a bipolar rivalry, America was able to advance and become the sole 
superpower in a unipolar world.  
The current global power structure is unique.  Never before has one country been 
so powerful and unrivaled.  The rise of a global hegemon that has shown it is willing to 
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act unilaterally if necessary has unsettled world politics and raised concerns about the 
“unprecedented disparities of power.”  The physical displays of American power in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq added to the existing concerns and raised new questions about the 
use of force, alliances, sovereignty, and weapons of mass destruction.143  In addition, it 
has caused many nations to reconsider their relations with the United States and how they 
may be able to influence the international actions of the most powerful nation. 
Russia, with its long tradition of balancing against US power, is one of the nations 
most concerned with American unipolarity.  Despite the fact that more than a decade has 
passed since the end of the Cold War, many of Russia’s political elite still view US 
actions with deep-seated suspicion.  They are particularly sensitive about the growing 
Western presence and influence in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence, including 
Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Baltic states.  Some theories go as far as to depict US 
bases in Central Asia as part of a larger effort to encircle Russia.144 
The world is a different place than it was during the Cold War.  New threats have 
emerged and the power structure has changed.  It is important to ascertain how Russia is 
responding to these changes.  The next section assesses Russian actions leading up to and 
during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom to see if Russian 
decision-makers view the US as a major threat and if balancing against American power 
is still a priority as it was during the Cold War.  If not, it is necessary to comprehend 
what the Russians view as threats to their national security and how willing they are to 
bandwagon with the US in balancing against those common threats.  The answers will 
help better formulate US policy towards Russia.   
 
B.   BALANCING POWER IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 
Based on the rhetoric in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept (FPC), one could 
reasonably assume that the US is still viewed as a significant threat by the Russian 
political elite and that their tendency would be to continue the zero-sum game begun 
during the Cold War.  This FPC refers to the Russian Federation as “a great power” and 
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“one of the most influential centers of the modern world.”145  The document also 
discloses Russian disdain for an increasingly unipolar international environment.  The 
concept refers to “domination of the United States” in the “establishment of a unipolar 
structure of the world” as a threat to Russia’s national interests.146  This rhetoric and the 
formation of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership led many Washington pundits to warn 
of a new alliance rising to balance against US predominance.147  Although challenging 
US domination of the international arena is clearly one of Russia’s interests, it is 
necessary to take a closer look at Russia’s changing stance in the US-led war on terrorism 
to better understand how this interest affected decision-making.  It did not appear to be a 
pressing concern when choosing a pro-Western position in Operation Enduring Freedom.  
However, the desire to form a multipolar world did resurface when it came to decisions 
about Operation Iraqi Freedom.   
1.   Operation Enduring Freedom 
Russian leaders were presumably not trying to balance against US power when 
they made the decision to cooperate with the United States during Operation Enduring 
Freedom.  Perhaps the best way to explain Russia’s decisions to join the US-led coalition 
and endorse US troops in Central Asia is to refer back to Walt’s concept of balancing 
against the most threatening power.  Growing Islamic extremism and regional instability 
within Central Asia and the Caucasus had troubled Russia for a decade prior to 9/11.  
Although none of the nations in Russia’s “soft underbelly” had much power in the 
traditional sense, they were considered dangerous because of their weakness and inability 
to regulate activity within their borders.  By using terrorist methods, Islamic 
fundamentalists based in those nations were able to use their proximity, offensive 
capability, and offensive intentions to become a threat to Russian national security 
despite their limited aggregate power.  
Russian concerns about Central Asia grew throughout the 1990s.  In particular, 
Russia was concerned about the proximity of several former Soviet republics to 
Afghanistan.  The still nascent nations had porous borders, slow economies, and weak 
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security that were particularly susceptible to threats like radical Islamic movements.  
These potential threats to stability were realized on several occasions during the 
nineties.148  In 1992, Russia felt compelled to intervene in the Tajik civil war against 
rebels based across the border in Afghanistan because of concerns about regional 
instability and the spread of Islamic extremism.149  February 1999 bombings in Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan reinforced apprehension about growing Islamic radicalism.150  In August 
1999, approximately 800 members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) raided 
and seized several villages in Kyrgyzstan with the intent to establish bases from which 
they could launch attacks into Uzbekistan.  At least one press report linked IMU funding 
to bin Laden.151  Russian concerns about these events in Central Asia plus unrest and 
spreading Islamic fundamentalism in Chechnya were manifested in national policies.  In 
1997, the bill “On Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations” was signed 
into law.  This law was designed to prevent the formation of radical religious sects by 
limiting the rights of organizations in existence for less than fifteen years and including 
provisions to liquidate organizations for undermining security or destroying unity in the 
Russian Federation.152  The expansion of religious extremism was also included as a 
threat in the Russian Federation National Security Concept approved in 2000.153 
Religious extremism is not the only threat to Russia emanating from the Central 
Asian region.  “The growth of international terrorism, transnational crime, as well as 
illegal trafficking in drugs and weapons, are beginning to exert significant influence on 
global and regional stability.”154  With few border security measures in place and no 
natural physical boundary to separate the old Soviet and current Russian borders, there is 
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little to prevent Central Asian troubles from becoming Russian problems.155  
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles is another major 
concern made worse by porous borders.  
Russia was facing a myriad of problems stemming from the situations in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus by the late nineties and began calling for international efforts to 
address certain issues, such as terrorism.  The 2000 National Security Concept of the 
Russian Federation states, “The problem of terrorism is transnational in nature and 
threatens stability in the world [and]…calls for pooling the efforts of the international 
community.”156  However, it was not until after the attacks of September 11th that the US 
and Russia joined together to battle a common threat, terrorism.  As part of the global war 
on terrorism, the United States was soon granted basing rights in Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgzstan and US troops deployed to Central Asia.157  
This was the first time in recent history that Russia welcomed another great power 
in what Russians commonly refer to as their “near abroad.”158  Russians view the CIS 
nations as part of their vitally important interests and have stated desires to preserve their 
political, cultural, economic, and security influence in that area.159  By accepting US 
troops in its backyard, Russia essentially admitted that it was incapable of maintaining 
stability within its sphere of influence and needed the US to “do [the] dirty work” of 
dislodging the Taliban.  This was obviously a concession Russian leaders were willing to 
make for a net gain of dampening some fundamentalist sentiment and restoring order in 
the region.160  Russia’s decision to join the US coalition and endorse US troops in its 
traditional sphere of influence suggests that bandwagoning to fight threats in the region 
was more important than balancing against US unipolar power. 
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2. Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has viewed the UN Security Council as 
an important vehicle for retaining influence in world affairs.  This was evident in 
President Putin’s strong statement about preserving the UN in his 2003 annual address to 
the Russian Federal Assembly.  He stated, “It is extremely important that if a certain 
threat intensifies…an understandable, transparent and universally acknowledged 
decision-making mechanism exists.  Undoubtedly, the most important such mechanism 
we have is the United Nations and its Security Council.”161  It is through the UN Security 
Council that Russia attempted, along with France and Germany, to oppose what would 
become known as Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
A large number of the Russian elite and their French and German counterparts 
especially welcomed this opportunity to “demonstrate that former superpowers can ‘stand 
up to’ and thwart the world’s ‘hyperpower.’”162  Despite the rhetoric about standing up to 
a hyperpower, Russia’s stance in OIF is not indicative of a change in strategy that would 
have Russians consistently pursuing anti-US policies.  Russia’s position leading up to 
OIF was more about the pursuit of pragmatic interests.  The Russians did not see Iraq as a 
serious threat to their national security.  Unlike Afghanistan, it does not share a border 
with any former Soviet states, no anti-Russian rebel fighters were training there, and it 
was not known to be a breeding ground for religious extremism.  In fact, Russia actually 
had strong economic ties with the Hussein regime.  Without proof of weapons of mass 
destruction or linkages to Islamic terrorists, Russia did not view Saddam’s regime as 
threatening.  Instead, it was considered a valuable economic partner. 
Russia’s interest in “reinforcing the key mechanisms of multilateral guidance of 
global political and economic processes” was also an important part of their opposition to 
OIF.163  According to the Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept, “only the UN 
Security Council has the authority to sanction use of force for the purpose of achieving 
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peace.”164  Any use of force outside the UN Charter is “unlawful and poses a threat to the 
stabilization of the entire system.”165  Russia’s uneasiness with Western nations acting 
outside UN convention can be traced back to the Kosovo conflict.  In executing 
Operation Allied Force, NATO acted without a UN mandate.  Russia subsequently 
labeled the action illegal because it was not authorized by the UN Security Council.  A 
statement issued by Yeltsin on the day NATO launched its attack summed up the Russian 
position.  “The whole contemporary international legal order has been put under 
threat.”166 The United States’ decision to proceed with the invasion of Iraq prior to UN 
approval was seen as another example of non-sanctioned use of military force similar to 
the situation in Kosovo.  It countered the Russian vision of a multipolar world using 
international institutions to maintain stability.  
The French-German-Russian “alliance” against the US was ultimately only 
symbolic because none of the countries were prepared to act against America.  In fact, 
throughout the time leading up to the US invasion of Iraq, Russia made overtures that 
indicated US-Russian cooperation was still possible.  The last thing Russia wanted to do 
was lose too much ground in US-Russian relations.  This was clearly stated by Russian 
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov when he remarked, “Regardless of what happens with Iraq, 
Russia hopes that Moscow and Washington will allow their actions to be guided by the 
spirit of Russian-American cooperation.”167  In the end, Russia spoke out against 
American unilateral action, but did not try to impose any serious consequences when the 
US proceeded to invade Iraq without UN approval. 
 
C.   CONCLUSION 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of Russian actions leading up 
to and during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.  First and 
foremost, it is obvious that Russian decision-making is not predominantly driven by 
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balancing US power.  “In 2001, in joining an alliance against terrorism formed by the 
United States, Russia for the first time in history recognized the hegemony of another 
state and voluntarily chose to play junior partner.”168  In this case, President Putin was 
willing to make certain concessions that would allow Russia to bandwagon with the US 
to defeat a common threat—terrorism.  President Putin joined the French and German 
leaders in speaking out against US unilateralism when it came to the conflict in Iraq, but 
did not make any moves to counter the United States’ ability to act.  President Putin’s 
desire to create a multipolar world in this instance can be seen in his comments about 
allowing the mechanisms within the UN Security Council to work; however, Russia 
realized the advancement of US-Russian relations was ultimately more important. 
    Although no serious negative consequences resulted from the Germans, French, 
and Russians banding together to oppose OIF, the simple fact that an anti-US group was 
created by major nations should be a lesson for US policymakers.  Much of the world is 
intimidated by US hegemony.  Increasing reservations about United States’ policies and 
role in the world has led to a dramatic shift in domestic public opinion against the US in 
many major countries.169  If it is true that states balance against threats, the US needs to 
remain mindful about being perceived as too threatening or new balancing alliances may 
emerge.  Plus, US policymakers should remember that the United States needs other 
nations to achieve its goals.170  A renewed interest in leading international institutions 







                                                 




V. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The attacks on September 11, 2001 resulted in unprecedented global cooperation 
and the formation of an international coalition to fight the war on terrorism.  For the first 
time in NATO history, the alliance invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and 
committed to collectively respond to the attack on the United States.171  However, the 
nations that joined the anti-terrorist coalition included far more than just NATO allies.  
Each country contributed to the war on terrorism in its own way—either militarily, 
diplomatically, economically, or financially.172 
In a very surprising and unexpected move, Russia joined the US-led coalition and 
began contributing to Operation Enduring Freedom, the mission against al Qaeda and the 
Taliban.  Russia’s assistance in the global war on terrorism amounted to far more than 
just verbal support.  By May 2002, President Putin and President Bush announced that 
the two nations were “achieving a new strategic relationship.”173  This remarkable 
rapprochement soon faltered as the US announced its intentions to invade Iraq with or 
without UN Security Council approval. 
The previous three chapters examined the relationship between various Russian 
national interests and Russia’s decisions to support Operation Enduring Freedom and 
oppose Operation Iraqi Freedom.  This final chapter uses those analyses to identify the 
national interest currently guiding Russian foreign policy, to determine the true nature of 
the US-Russian relationship, and make relevant suggestions about how to proceed in 
future relations with Russia. 
 
A.    RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
Russian foreign policy proved to be very inconsistent throughout the nineties.  
The contradictions in strategy often resulted in considerable confusion at home and 
abroad and led to uncertainty about what direction Russian foreign policy would take 
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next.  This was often a result of Russian leaders pursuing “policy without a solid 
conceptual foundation.”174  Many felt that President Putin was continuing this legacy of 
ambiguity in foreign policy by supporting OEF and not war in Iraq.  One expert stated, 
“Although the character of Putin’s regime now seems clear, what he intends to do with 
this power in his second term in office remains maddeningly opaque.”175   
After examining Putin’s choices in the war on terrorism while taking into account 
Russian national interests, there does appear to be sound reasoning and consistent logic 
behind his decisions.  An analysis of the data presented in the previous three chapters 
begets the conclusion that Russian foreign policy really is based on “mutually 
advantageous pragmatism” as stated in the 2000 Russian Federation Foreign Policy 
Concept.176  More specifically, Russian foreign policy can best be understood by taking 
into consideration Russia’s economic goals. 
This study evaluated three prevalent arguments about the motivation behind 
Russian foreign policy decisions, including the desire to balance US unilateralism, gain 
support for “anti-terrorist” action in Chechnya, and advance national economic interests.  
Of the three, advancing economic development appears to have the strongest correlation 
with the decisions made in the war on terrorism.  The other two variables seem to play a 
role in foreign policy decisions as well, but are lower priorities.   
Russia joined the US-led coalition in OEF because it had the potential to benefit 
the nation economically.   By declaring its support for the US, Russia was able to gain 
entrance to several international economic institutions and was declared a market 
economy.  Russians were also able to open up a new energy dialogue with the US.  Their 
economy will also benefit when the instability in Central Asia is quelled.  New markets 
will open up and monetary losses due to the black market and smuggling will decline.  
On the other hand, the Russians opposed OIF, knowing economic losses would be 
unavoidable should the Hussein regime fall.  Billions of dollars would be lost due to the 
invalidation of numerous contracts.   
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The other two variables, obtaining support for the war in Chechnya and balancing 
against US unilateralism, did not correlate as convincingly with Russia’s decisions in 
OEF and OIF.  Gaining recognition for Russia’s war against “terrorists” in Chechnya 
could definitely be seen as an interest that would drive Russia’s decision to participate in 
OEF; however, Russia’s decision not to support action in Iraq would do little to build 
Western support for the Chechen conflict.  Finally, balancing against US power is an 
unlikely explanation for Russia’s choices in the war on terrorism.  Rather, Russia’s 
decisions to bandwagon with the US in Afghanistan and not in Iraq are indicative of 
balancing against threats, not power.177  Thus, economic development appears to be the 
most significant of the three factors currently shaping Russian foreign policy.  This 
conclusion is consistent with President Putin’s statement to the Russian ambassadors in 
July:  “Russian diplomacy should help tackle national tasks more energetically than ever 
before.  These tasks include raising economic competitiveness, a radical increase in GDP, 
and the integration of Russia into the world economy.”178  US policymakers need to 
recognize this inclination in Russian decision-making in order to devise coherent and 
prudent policies concerning Russia. 
Russia’s economic weakness is seen as the biggest threat to Russia, undermining 
its capacity to effectively manage national and regional affairs and achieve great power 
status.  A stable Russian economy is clearly in Russia’s best interest, but it is also 
advantageous for the United States.  An economically-sound Russia will be able allocate 
more resources to modernizing the country.179  This includes dedicating more assets to 
prevent the proliferation of WMD.  It will also allow for true military reform, including 
the move away from conscription and toward a more professional military.  A more 
professional army should result in less border control problems and will help manage the 
situation in Chechnya in a more humane manner.   
Some realists believe a strong Russia will become a threat to the United States; 
however, this fear seems overrated considering President Putin’s orientation to the West.  
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He has shown his desire to be integrated with the West in his foreign policy and through 
his desire to become a part of western institutions.  This is evident in the creation of the 
NATO-Russia council and the subdued objections to NATO expansion.180  It is also 
apparent in Russia’s cooperation in allowing US bases in Central Asia. 
 
B.   NATURE OF THE US-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP 
The global war on terrorism brought about a whole new level of cooperation 
between the United States and Russia.  Top political leaders began referring to the new 
relationship as a “strategic partnership” and calling the two nations “allies.”181  Even 
after sharp differences over Iraq exposed limitations in the US-Russian partnership, Putin 
reiterated that he had made a “strategic choice” in favor of the US.182  Although 
collaboration between the two nations did increase considerably, the rhetoric is 
misleading; in reality, the partnership is far more pragmatic than strategic. 
Neither the US nor Russia was willing to allow disagreements over Iraq to 
completely destroy the partnership they had built.  But the relationship is hardly based on 
true strategic cooperation, if that is defined as “relations…motivated by underlying 
agreement regarding the overall nature of international relations, the sources of potential 
and actual security threats and the most appropriate means of responding to such 
threats.”183  “Trust, concurrent views and the closeness of interests and ideals are 
essential” for a strategic partnership.184   
It is clear from these definitions that Russia and the US are incapable of being 
strategic partners at this point in time.  To begin with, the two nations do not agree on the 
sources or priority of security threats.  As discussed in Chapter IV, Russia did not view 
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Iraq and its WMD potential as imminently dangerous and decided not to bandwagon with 
the US to oppose the Iraqi “threat.”  The US and Russia also continue to be at odds 
regarding Russia’s nuclear cooperation with Iran.185  In both cases, Russian leaders 
placed short-term economic interests above safeguarding nuclear technology, which has a 
high probability of becoming a future threat.  In addition, Russian leaders’ attitudes about 
recent expansion of NATO to include the Baltic states remain “reserved and negative.”186  
It is even debatable whether the US and Russia define terrorism the same way, especially 
in Chechnya and the Caucasus.187  Next, the United States and Russia do not agree on the 
nature of international relations.  Russia desires a multipolar world where it plays a polar 
role, while the US has shown its ability and willingness to act unilaterally as the global 
hegemon.  A true US and Russian strategic partnership is also thwarted by a large values 
gap that prevents the cultivation of trust.  The Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov 
summed up the relationship by saying that US and Russia are “certainly not enemies, but 
probably not allies yet.”188 
The current partnership between the United States and Russia is best 
characterized as pragmatic.  Pragmatic cooperation is “motivated by traditional concerns 
of national interest.”189  Both the Americans and Russians have found ways to effectively 
collaborate when it benefits their nations or aids them in reaching national objectives.  
Clearly, pragmatic concerns about advancing Russia’s economic interests were at the 
forefront of President Putin’s mind in calculating his choices in the United States’ war on 
terrorism.  The problem with pragmatic cooperation is that it has a high likelihood of 
being “tactical and temporary rather than significant and enduring.”190  At a time when 
the US needs allies in order to succeed in the fight against terrorism, prevent proliferation 
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of WMD, and manage the rise of China as a global power, it may behoove the US to 
work towards creating a more strategic relationship with Russia.  
 
C.   THE FUTURE OF US-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 
1.  Why the US Needs Russia 
Regardless of whether the current partnership is classified as strategic or 
pragmatic, it is important for the United States to recognize that Russian cooperation in 
the present international environment is a valuable asset.  “Russia occupies geopolitical 
and policy space crucial to the conduct and success of the long-term counterterrorist 
mission that President Bush has placed at the center of American policy.”191  The 
Russians also have stronger ties and more influence than Americans in many Middle 
Eastern nations.192  In addition, they maintain well-developed intelligence agencies that 
provide them with greater access to certain key regions.193  Thus, Russia has the potential 
to affect important American interests. 
A strong US-Russian relationship will help the US achieve numerous foreign 
policy and security goals.  In particular, Russia can assist the US in meeting its goals in 
the war on terrorism as presented in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 
(NSCT).  This document consistently stresses the importance of renewing the United 
States’ emphasis on its intelligence capabilities, repeatedly stating that good, accurate 
intelligence is essential to disrupting terrorist plans and operations.  It also highlights the 
value of denying terrorist groups the things they need to survive, including safe havens, 
financial resources, and access to targets.194  Robust international cooperation is 
necessary to achieve these objectives.  The US acknowledges that “success will not come 
from  acting  alone,  but  through  a  powerful  coalition  of  nations  maintaining a strong  
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united, international front against terrorism.”195  Russia specifically can aid the US 
because of its unique geographical position, experience in Afghanistan, and human 
intelligence capabilities.   
The US will also benefit from working closely with Russia on preventing 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  Both Iran and North Korea continue to 
develop nuclear weapons and terrorist groups have made known their intentions to 
acquire these weapons.196  Cooperation between the United States and Russia is required 
to develop new, updated non-proliferation agreements that address the evolving WMD 
threats of the twenty-first century.  Fighting instability and extremism in Central Asia is 
another area where collaboration with Russia may benefit the US.  It certainly would be 
in the best interest of both nations to prevent countries like Uzbekistan from becoming 
failed states and breeding grounds for terrorism.197  Finally, Russia can also contribute to 
“peacefully managing the rise of China as a great power” and helping the US achieve “a 
stable global energy supply.”198  The US must realize that Russia can provide vital 
assistance in the war on terrorism as well as other policy areas and should make efforts to 
create a durable, mutually beneficial relationship. 
2. Path to a Better Partnership 
There are certainly some challenges inherent in building a strong, lasting 
relationship between two recent enemies, especially when one nation is still in the 
process of transitioning to a democratic government and market economy.  The current 
relationship between the US and Russia is one of pragmatic cooperation, fueled only by 
limited mutual interests and a common enemy.199  While this relationship is seemingly 
helping each side to meet some of their national goals, history is full of examples where 
alliances fell apart in the midst of fighting a presumed common enemy.200  This tendency 
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exposes the fragility of the current US-Russian relationship.  The United States’ desire to 
maintain its ability to act unilaterally has definitely stressed the relationship.  Continued 
unilateral action has a high probability of further harming the relationship, considering 
that “Russia believes that the settlement of international problems on a collective basis in 
strict accordance with the rules of international law should become a fundamental 
principle of this system.”201  Another obstacle in building a strong partnership is Russia’s 
continuing transformation from a communist state to a democracy.  Russia has on several 
occasions strayed from its path of establishing democratic principles within its borders.  
This does not bode well for an equal partnership, especially since most experts agree 
“that a country cannot become a complete partner of the Western alliance until it 
becomes fully democratic.”202  These challenges make creating a lasting partnership 
more difficult, but they are not insurmountable.  The US simply needs to be realistic and 
build a strategy that takes into account both these challenges and Russian views on 
international relations. 
Moving from a pragmatic to a more strategic level of cooperation will not happen 
immediately; it requires building a common understanding of the nature of international 
relations.203  However, there are several things the US can do to help expedite the 
process, or at least keep it moving in the right direction.  Emphasizing and assisting 
Russia’s transition to a true market democracy is a good place to start.  Building trust 
through open dialogue, transparency in actions, and people-to-people exchanges will also 
help. Decreasing the emphasis on unilateralism and US’ ability to act outside established 
rules of international organizations is another step in the right direction.  Finally, the US 
can create incentives for cooperation based on one of Russia’s key national interests, 
economic development. 
a. Transition to Democracy 
Russia’s conversion to a democracy is far from complete.  A survey 
completed in June 2003 asked Russian citizens where they could place their country on a 
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scale from one to ten, one meaning a complete dictatorship and ten indicating a complete 
democracy.  Prior to perestroika, a majority of Russians considered Russia to be between 
a three and a five with the largest percentage at three.  In the latest survey of the current 
conditions, the majority believe Russia is between a four and a six with the largest 
percentage at five.204  It has been over a decade since the end of communism and Russia 
has failed to make enough progress to be considered a true democracy. 
Russia is failing to abide by several democratic principles.  According to 
Secretary of State Powell, the essential balance between the branches of government is 
missing.  “Political power is not yet fully tethered to law.  Key aspects of civil society—
free media and political party development, for example—have not yet sustained an 
independent presence.”205  Other obstacles in building democracy are the lack of social 
capital and trust.  Truly free and fair elections remain elusive, and it is difficult for 
citizens to organize adequate political opposition.  Only seven percent of Russians place 
full trust in Parliament and most are cynical about its role, since the members of 
Parliament do not have control over the ministries and the president can issue unilateral 
decrees.  Russians question the value of electing officials who have no power to impose 
the opinions of their constituents.  The rule of law continues to be weak.  In lieu of 
expecting the law to work or public officials to act as they should, the use of connections, 
informal favors, patron-client relations, and monetary bribes is common.206   
The US has cooperated and even entered into alliances with non-
democratic nations, but only democratic allies have proven to be trustworthy over the 
long run.207  Thus, Russia’s partial democracy could be an acute obstacle in building a 
lasting US-Russian partnership.  Therefore, the United States should implement policies 
that  will  foster  democracy  in  Russia.   Discussions on democracy should be placed on  
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state-to-state meeting agendas and given a higher priority in talks between the nations’ 
leaders.  Another essential part of helping Russia’s transition is placing more emphasis on 
the rule of law.   
The US also needs to find ways to empower Russia’s pro-democratic 
citizens and society.  The US should encourage Russia to set up public-interest clinics, 
civil liberties unions, and education programs at Russian universities.  Increasing the 
number of exchanges, such as military-to-military, sister city, and internship programs, 
will also help in spreading both the democratic ideals and the rule of law.208  Over the 
last decade Congress provided generous support for US-Russian exchanges in order to 
aid in Russia’s transition from a communist state; however, that funding is scheduled to 
decline drastically in the next few years.209  Congress should reconsider this budget 
decrease based on the new international situation and the war on terrorism.  "Public 
diplomacy—exchange programs and cultural activities—help create mutual 
understanding, which leads to mutual respect.”  These programs are a “long-term 
investment in homeland security.”210  Because democracy is a huge part of Russia 
becoming an authentic US ally, the United States should continue to support and augment 
programs that foster democratic principles within Russian society at the grassroots level 
and reinforce the importance of those values with Russian political leadership.   
b. Economic Cooperation  
To build a lasting relationship, the US must help Russia get past the 
feeling that the relationship is a one-way street in favor of the US.  The US can begin 
“structuring Russian choices by providing sufficient benefits through cooperation to 
outweigh the costs imposed by necessary and inevitable US actions at variance with 
Russian preferences.”211  This requires identifying convergent interests and pursuing 
them, while looking for creative solutions in areas where interests diverge.  Realizing that 
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one of Russia’s main national interests is economic development, the US can provide 
support to help Russia advance economically.   
Numerous reforms need to occur in order for Russia to establish a stable 
and prosperous economy while reaching President Putin’s stated economic goals of 
doubling the GDP and reducing poverty.  Russia needs to open its markets, eliminate 
trade and investment barriers, create a predictable investment and entrepreneurial 
environment, increase transparency, and craft clear and fair laws regarding property and 
contractual rights.212  The US has the ability to help Russia in several of these areas.  
American experts can work with Russian lawmakers on developing policies that regulate 
property rights.  The US can further expand ties in the energy sector by reaching mutually 
beneficial agreements on developing Russian oil fields.213  With respect to trade issues, 
US lawmakers should repeal the Jackson-Vanik amendment and eliminate any other 
remaining laws or limitations aimed at the Soviet Union.214   The US can also help 
Russia secure entrance into international economic organizations that it has not yet been 
allowed to join.  Finally, the US can provide economic assistance to Russia through 
projects that benefit both nations, such as cooperative programs for nuclear 
nonproliferation.  The US and the international community should continue to support 
initiatives like the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program’s highly enriched 
uranium purchase agreement and the G8 Global Partnership’s pledge to raise $20 billion 
over 10 years to prevent the spread of WMD.215  The US needs to realize that Russia will 
respond well to economic incentives; for example, if the US wants to continue on a path 
of unilateralism, economic compensation can help smooth over the discord and maintain 
a viable relationship with Russia. 
Another approach the US can take in assisting Russia is to tie financial 
support to the development of democratic principles and civil society.  Some Russian 
debts could be written off or restructured with the understanding that those funds would 
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then be reinvested in development programs that build democratic institutions or 
organizations that support an independent press, human rights, the environment, civil 
society, or exchange programs.216  Further debt reduction would then depend on Russia’s 
progress in successfully establishing certain democratic principles such as rule of law and 
human rights.  These are examples of how the US may gain valuable ground in 
compromising with Russia, while preventing Russians from feeling like the relationship 
is one-sided.  Plus, these actions can help Russia develop a stable economy and a more 
prosperous society which will, in turn, make Russia a stronger US partner in the fight 
against common threats.217 
c. Subtle Hegemony 
One of the biggest obstacles to increased US-Russian cooperation is the 
emphasis America has placed on unilateral action.  Russia’s frustration with United 
States acting outside established international rules and institutions was obvious in 1999 
and again in 2003 as the US prepared for and executed Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The 
German-French-Russian partnership that formed as a result of this frustration never 
amounted to much, but it clearly indicated that certain nations object to US unilateral 
policy.  Although America is “not sufficiently threatening to provoke a [true] 
counterbalancing response,” US power does alarm other major nations.218      
  As stated in the US National Security Strategy, “The US possesses 
unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence in the world.”219  Many nations 
have begun questioning what America will do with its overwhelming power after Iraq 
and how they should proceed in relations with the US.  The two main strategies that have 
emerged thus far are resistance and engagement.  Nations that resist will “seek to loosen 
ties and undercut or block American power and policy,” while those that engage will 
build “cooperative ties in the hope of gaining opportunities to influence how American 
power is exercised.”220   
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The United States has the ability to affect which path nations will choose 
by indicating how it plans to flex its power in the future.  America can either pursue a 
policy of liberal hegemony or hegemony with imperial characteristics.  The former 
indicates that America will use its power to “promote order organized around 
multilateralism, close alliance partnerships, strategic commitment and restraint, and 
extensive jointly agreed upon institutions and rules for managing relationships.”  The 
latter option is indicative of an America that “acts unilaterally against the goals and 
interests of other states, engages in coercive domination to get its way, and degrades 
global rules and institutions.”221  States have greater incentives and will therefore engage 
rather than resist the US if the US leans more toward the model of liberal hegemony.  On 
the other hand, the US will be increasingly viewed as a threat if it chooses to adopt a 
policy of hegemony with imperial ambitions; nations will then have a tendency to resist 
and may even balance against what they see as an emerging threat.222   
The US requires active cooperation from Russia and other nations to reach 
many of its national objectives.  “The US may be preeminent but it is not omnipotent.”223  
Therefore, the US must use its power wisely to encourage cooperation and to avoid being 
seen as a threat.  The US should eliminate rhetoric about reserving the right to act alone 
and try to stay within the framework of established international institutions.  This will 
help the US gain valuable ground when dealing not only with Russia, but other nations.  
Had the US stayed within the UN framework when it came to Iraq, Russia probably 
would have supported US action; if nothing else, the US would have gained some 
legitimacy.224  The key here is realizing that compromise is a necessary part of 
international relations.  
 
D.  CONCLUSION 
A more strategic US-Russian relationship will help the United States achieve 
various national security objectives.  The analysis here suggests that economic 
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development is the primary interest driving Russian foreign policy.  By recognizing the 
significance of this interest, the US can act accordingly to develop a stronger rapport with 
the Russian Federation by assisting Russia in its continuing transition to a true 
democracy, increasing economic cooperation, and avoiding unilateral international 
policies.  Russia also stands to gain from a solid partnership with the US and should 
make efforts to build upon existing cooperation in matters other than the global war on 
terrorism.  Russia should take a longer-term approach when forming its national interests 
and reprioritize accordingly.  For example, the nuclear proliferation threat that the US 
envisions emerging from places like Iran and North Korea will most likely translate into a 
threat for Russia as well.  The US would certainly appreciate it if Russian foreign policy 
objectives focused less on making economic gains by selling nuclear technology and 
more on the potential threats that may result from having more nuclear nations in the 
world.  Building stronger US-Russian relations is a goal both nations must want and be 
willing to work toward. 
When the US and Russia united under the auspices of an anti-terrorist coalition 
and began working to improve bilateral relations it was a step in the right direction, but 
there is still a long way to go.  Cooperation in the war on terrorism provided the US with 
valuable information about Russian foreign policy and gave US policymakers the ability 
to understand the true nature of US-Russian relations.   The United States can learn from 
this information and form policies that will help Russia develop into a nation capable of 
being a true US ally.  Then, over time, as Russia becomes more democratized and 
American and Russian norms and values begin to align, the currently pragmatic 
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